In November, the local authorities in the central city of Changsha decked out a street with pink banners sporting slogans like “Doing housework is the best” and “Having three children is the coolest” in a bid to encourage young couples to have children.

The “marriage-themed cultural street”, complete with wedding photo backdrops, was roundly mocked by netizens for leaning into stereotypes and its tone-deaf messaging.

“Rather than increasing salaries and social insurance of young people, this is what Changsha uses its money for?” one user questioned on Chinese social media platform Weibo.

In a desperate – and some would say futile – attempt to slow and reverse the population decline caused by its one-child policy and urbanisation, the Chinese government has recently doubled down on measures to boost the nation’s birth rate.

China’s State Council, or Cabinet, in late October detailed 13 measures to build a “birth-friendly society”. Incentives include mandating better maternity insurance and leave, improving childcare and housing support, and advocating positive views on marriage and parenthood through social awareness campaigns.

Previous efforts include giving couples cash incentives for their second and third child, which first started in Sichuan in 2021 and has expanded to 23 provinces since.

Local governments have quickly heeded the latest call, by pushing out relevant policies.

Two weeks ago, the southernmost island province of Hainan allowed labour pain relief to be covered by public health insurance. Cities in central Hubei province have also been handing out subsidies, increasing maternity leave and housing aid.

Even colleges and universities are being asked to play a part, with state-run China Population News urging higher-education institutions to provide “marriage and love education” to emphasise positive views on marriage, love, fertility and family.

But such measures are not all that enticing, some couples and demography experts tell The Straits Times.

“Giving birth is not the issue; the issue is raising the child and having to deal with education pressures,” said Ms Jacqueline Zhou, a 37-year-old visual merchandiser from Inner Mongolia who lives in Beijing. She has a two-year-old son, and does not want a second child.

“I’ll also have to save more money for his future, such as for his wedding and buying an apartment for him,” she said, referring to Chinese dowry custom and practices.

Her sentiment is shared by many in her generation, who are increasingly shelving marriage and parenthood plans due to the rising cost of raising a child, education pressures, lack of caregivers and marriage inequality.

Traditional Chinese medicine doctor Gavin Liu, 35, and his wife say they will not consider having a second child unless they have better childcare arrangements.

Their two-year-old daughter is cared for by their parents, who take turns travelling from northern China to the southern coastal city of Shenzhen, living in the couple’s home for up to six months at a time.

“This childcare arrangement is taxing on our ageing parents, but we don’t have many options as work and life in Shenzhen are stressful,” said Mr Liu, whose wife also works in the healthcare industry in Shenzhen.

“Having a child and how many is a personal choice; whether there are policies or not is irrelevant,” said Mr Liu, who is from Shaanxi.

China ended its decades-long one-child policy in 2016, increasing the cap to two children and then to three in 2021. But by then the momentum of declining fertility was already set.

China’s fertility rate, which stood at around 1.09 in 2022, has led to a shrinking labour force, an ageing population, and insufficient consumption, leading to a slowing economy. A country generally needs women to each have 2.1 children in their lifetime for its population to remain constant.

Dr Zhao Litao, senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute (EAI), said that China’s proposed incentives reflect the government’s awareness of the reasons why parents hesitate to have children, such as high childcare costs, education pressures and insufficient caregiving support.

However, the measures are largely focused on material constraints, he noted. “The policies overlook the diverse preferences and evolving values of the younger generations, who prioritise flexible, low-stress lifestyles over traditional family roles.”

Some efforts have also been criticised for being intrusive, with Chinese women of childbearing age sharing accounts of local officials calling them to inquire about their childbirth plans.

Further denting appetite for baby-making is China’s economic malaise that has left many anxious about their employment prospects, as youth unemployment remains high, along with an ailing property sector.

The Covid-19 pandemic also brought on feelings of inertia and hopelessness, leading to disillusioned young people in China identifying as being “the last generation”, and swearing off having children.

To analyse the “sentiments of reluctance and fear” surrounding having children, China has recently launched a nationwide population survey to sample 30,000 individuals across 150 counties and 1,500 different communities.

Professor Yun Zhou, a social demographer at the University of Michigan in the United States, said the clarion call to build a “birth-friendly society” promotes a highly rigid and singular vision of what the “Chinese family” should and should not look like.

“Without addressing fundamental, structural issues such as labour market gender discrimination, policies that are single-mindedly pro-natalist are rarely effective,” she said.

Chinese women are paid less compared with men, on top of discriminatory practices against them, with working mothers often having to juggle both career and family commitments.

In 2023, new births in China hit a record low of 9.02 million, down 5.7 per cent from the previous year, as India overtook it to become the world’s most populous nation.

By 2040, the number of people aged 60 or above in China is predicted to soar to 402 million, up from 280 million in end-2022, which experts have warned will increase demands on government spending and put the already weakened economy under greater strain.

EAI’s Dr Zhao said that local governments often operate under the constraints of “unfunded mandates”, meaning they are required to perform certain actions but have budgetary constraints, which leads to uneven implementation. Without national-level coordination and sustained funding, local measures may remain isolated and insufficient to tackle the issue, he said.

Dr Fuxian Yi, a demographer at the University of Wisconsin, said China’s relatively low household disposable income has made it hard for the average Chinese family to raise one child, let alone two or three.

Coupled with more young people attaining higher education, which will push back their marriage and childbearing timeline, China’s fertility rate will continue to decline, said Dr Yi.

“The decline in the fertility rate is like a giant rock rolling down a hill, which is inevitable. Now the giant rock is at the foot of the hill, and it will be very difficult to move it uphill,” he said.

-In Association with ANN